6 Reasons Power Plants Need to Implement an Industrial Cybersecurity Program Now
By Ian Bramson, Global Head of Industrial Cybersecurity at ABS Group
In the last year, a surge of unprecedented cyber attacks has thrust industrial cybersecurity into the spotlight, making it a top priority for organizations around the world. This is particularly true for businesses within critical infrastructure sectors like power and energy. Threat actors have moved from stealing valuable data to attacking operational technology (OT) networks, allowing them to gain control over entire market ecosystems.
Some of this year’s incidents have affected thegas and power industries and reiterate how hackers can shut down operations. These breaches show the impact on a nation’s supply chain and economy and confirmed that critical infrastructure is a valuable target—and a vulnerable one. Organizations must prioritize the implementation of industrial cybersecurity programs if they want to protect their operations, the environment, and their communities.
What Makes the Power Industry Vulnerable to Attacks?
1. Lack of cybersecurity controls: The power and energy industry does not have standard OT cybersecurity strategies and regulations. This has led to companies having disparate—and often inadequate—security practices. Furthermore, OT support too often relies on existing teams ill-equipped to meet the needs of an OT program. IT professionals either lack experience in OT cyber or operations teams are at a disadvantage because they do not understand cybersecurity principles. Contrary to what many organizational leaders believe, IT solutions cannot simply be applied to OT systems. They require specialized cybersecurity solutions and dedicated staff with OT expertise.
2. Growing operations drive the expansion of attack surfaces: As power and energy organizations expand their operations, the ways in which cyber threats can penetrate systems, also known as “attack surfaces,” are growing. Attackers are now trained to exploit the cracks found in these larger attack surfaces.
3. Remote capabilities are open to attacks: Today, many power and energy organizations have dispersed assets and are heavily dependent on remote monitoring for management. While this connectivity offers many competitive advantages, it also creates vulnerabilities. Each remote device is a possible point of failure. As these ecosystems grow, so too does risk.
4. Modern technologies pose new cyber risks: Digitalization, data analytics and automation are all competitive advantages. However, they pose new cyber risks. Many industrial environments are comprised of decades-old legacy systems. These systems were built for longevity—but they weren’t designed to be connected to wide area networks (WANs) or other modern technologies. This makes them vulnerable to attack.
5. Attackers want more than data – they want physical control:
Cyber attackers no longer just want to steal and manipulate data—they want direct control over physical environments. Attacks can now damage critical infrastructure, grind operations to a halt, threaten national security and put lives at risk by crippling essential industries.
6. Attackers are forming businesses: Although there are many distinct types of cyber attackers with different motivations, they have started to form businesses around hacking. While terrorists and hacktivists may not be working with each other, these groups are forming alliances with other individuals who share their values to broaden their reach and expand their capabilities.
Make OT Cybersecurity a Priority
Organizations must understand that patching the vulnerability that led to the last high-profile attack isn’t enough. Since attackers are highly adaptable and constantly evolving, power plants must focus on building robust industrial cybersecurity programs that take a proactive approach to security. It’s vital to prepare for when, not if, an attack occurs.
The most successful organizations develop a framework early. It should include processes for identifying weaknesses, protecting against attacks, detecting attacks when they occur, responding quickly and recovering effectively. Taking a proactive approach will make an organization resilient to future attempts and provide peace of mind in a quickly changing environment.
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CAISO Generator Modeling Process and Data Requirements
Don’t wait until the last minute. You should allow time for at least one iteration with CAISO so that you are complete and deemed compliant before your deadline.
On August 1, 2018, CAISO introduced a revised Business Practice Manual for Transmission Planning Process (BPM), which includes new data requirements for interconnected generation resources within the ISO’s footprint. Section 10 of the BPM establishes revised data requirements and compliance procedures for all participating generators including non-NERC registered entities. While additional requirements have been placed on larger NERC registered facilities, these changes may pose an even greater burden to entities that have been exempt from NERC mandated modeling and protection requirements.
New data requirements include voltage and frequency protection models, power flow models, and in some cases, sub-synchronous resonance models. These models must be verified using criteria listed in the BPM, which can only be performed by entities with modeling software and knowledge of modeling practices.
NAES is prepared to assist entities with data aggregation, modeling, and testing to ensure compliance with CAISO’s data requests. The following links will allow entities to determine when to expect their individual data requests (phase) and what data will be required (category).
TPL-007 establishes planning criteria for induced currents caused by geomagnetic disturbances. The standard is applicable to facilities using transformer(s) with a high side, wye grounded winding operated above 200 kV and can require both submittal of general geomagnetic data (R2) and thermal impact assessments (R6) depending on results of Planning Coordinator analysis.
VOLTAGE AND REACTIVE (VAR) STANDARDS
VAR-501-WECC
VAR-501-WECC requires applicable entities within the WECC region to confirm performance settings and characteristics of Power System Stabilizers (PSS). NAES provides physical testing and reporting services to address WECC’s specific PSS requirements.
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE, TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS
PER-006
PER-006 requires Generator Operators to provide training to personnel who are responsible for the Real-time control of a generator. NAES has developed specific protection system training materials suitable for compliance with the Standard and provides this training both on and off site
PROTECTION AND CONTROL (PRC) STANDARDS
PRC-001
PRC-001 requires entities to coordinate protection system changes with other affected parties. NAES offers both procedural documentation and engineering services to establish the required coordination for both PRC-001 and PRC-027.
PRC-002
PRC-002 requires the installation and operation of disturbance monitoring equipment (DME) for applicable entities. NAES can assist with the design and installation of DME as well as ongoing compliance support.
PRC-019
PRC-019 requires applicable entities to show coordination between voltage regulating controls, limiters, equipment capabilities, and protection settings. NAES produces PRC-019 specific coordination studies for both traditional generators and renewable projects to establish compliance with the Standard.
PRC-023
PRC-023 requires load responsive protective relays be set according to criteria within the Standard to ensure settings do not limit transmission loadability. NAES provides full engineering analyses to maintain compliance with this Standard.
PRC-024
PRC-024 requires applicable entities to ensure generator protective relays do not trip within predefined frequency and voltage limits. NAES can complete protection settings analyses and provide compliance documentation that clearly identifies protection settings as they relate to NERC’s “no trip” zones.
PRC-025
PRC-025 establishes minimum settings requirements for load-responsive relays protecting generators, step up transformers, and auxiliary transformers. NAES utilizes predefined calculation options as well as simulations to determine a facility’s compliance status and development of new relay settings if required.
PRC-026
PRC-026 requires applicable entities to perform load responsive relay settings analyses based on criteria identified within the Standard. Entities are typically notified by the Planning Coordinator when an analysis is required. NAES performs all required studies to establish compliance.
MODELING, DATA, AND ANALYSIS (MOD) STANDARDS
MOD-025
MOD-025 requires Real and Reactive Power capability testing for individual generating units over 20 MVA or facilities with over 75 MVA of generation capacity. NAES offers site specific test procedures and/or complete onsite testing services to meet the requirements of this standard.
MOD-026
MOD-026 requires verification of excitation or volt/var control dynamic models through utilization of either system disturbances or physical testing. NAES offers full testing and modeling services to meet the requirements of this standard.
MOD-027
MOD-027 requires verification of governor or active power/frequency control dynamic models through utilization of either system disturbances or physical testing. NAES offers full testing and modeling services to meet the requirements of this standard.